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ABSTRACT 
 
Lauren A. Merkel: The Salience Of Sectarianism: Iraqi Shi‘a in American Perceptions, 1958-
1979 
(Under the direction of Cemil Aydin) 
 
 
This thesis traces the emergence of official American perceptions of Shi‘a sectarianism in 
Iraq and identifies the transition point when American diplomats and intelligence analysts began 
to perceive the Iraqi Shi‘a as a threat to American interests in the region. Two factors shaped 
these perceptions: First, a lack of knowledge and mistaken understanding of Iraqi Shi‘a 
communities and political dissident movements among the American diplomatic and intelligence 
communities contributed to a false equivalence of Iraqi Shi‘a dissidence as purely religious when 
its goals were largely political in nature. Second, these misperceptions regarding internal Iraqi 
society allowed external factors, such as the Cold War and the Iranian Revolution, to play a 
disproportionate role in shaping official American perceptions of Iraqi Shi‘a sectarianism. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, THEORY, AND HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
 
During a 2016 interview with The Atlantic, when asked about the situation in the Middle 
East, American President Barrack Obama stated, “You’ve got countries that have very few civic 
traditions, so that as autocratic regimes start fraying, the only organizing principles are 
sectarian.”1 With this statement, President Obama reinforced the role of sectarian divisions in the 
minds of The Atlantic’s readership and displayed a paradigm through which he understood the 
Middle East. President Obama is hardly alone in his understanding of sectarian organization as a 
primary social factor in the Middle East. Indeed the oversimplified binary of Sunni versus Shi‘a 
religious traditions is reflected throughout American research, diplomatic, and policy efforts in 
the region. However, the sectarian paradigm ignores, disregards, and downplays other types of 
identity that exist, often unacknowledged, and disregards alternative reasons for conflict. This is 
especially true in Iraq. Iraqis have historically embraced both ethnic and national forms of 
identity, and surges of seemingly sectarian conflict are often the product of political, not 
religious, exigencies. Yet the Sunni-Shi‘a divide influences recent American diplomatic 
understandings of Iraqi history and the paradigm through which current events are interpreted.   
The eruption of sectarian violence in Iraq after the American invasion in 2003 generated 
a multitude of new scholarly investigations and insights. Kalil Osman, Fanar Haddad, Danny 
                                                             
1 Jeffery Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016, retrieved from  
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ on 14 March 2017.  
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Postel and Nader Hashimi have specifically investigated sectarian identity formation in Iraq.2 
Other academics such as Vali Nasser, Juan Cole, and Sabrina Mervin have pursued questions of 
broader Shi‘a role in geopolitics in the Arab world.3 Similarly, there is no lack of scholarly 
attention devoted to the relationship between Iraq and the United States, given the tortured 
relationship between the two.4 The American-Iraqi relationship is a rollercoaster of cautious 
optimism, abrogated diplomatic relations, military and economic aid, and assistance in a regional 
war, culminating in two American invasions with an interregnum of punishing sanctions.  
For all the scholarly attention devoted to American-Iraqi relations and Shi’a political 
efforts, no studies specifically examine how American diplomats perceived Shi‘a sectarianism in 
Iraq. In initiating this foray, I trace the emergence of American perceptions of Shi‘a sectarianism 
in Iraq and identify the transition point when American diplomats began to perceive Iraqi Shi‘a 
as a threat to American interests in the region. I contend that two factors shaped these 
perceptions: First, a lack of knowledge and mistaken American understanding of Iraqi Shi‘a 
communities and political dissident movements contributed to a false equivalence of Iraqi Shi‘a 
dissidence as purely religious when its goals were largely political in nature. Second, these 
misperceptions regarding internal Iraqi society allowed external factors to play a 
                                                             
2 Fanar Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity (London: Hurst, 2011). Nader Hashemi and 
Danny Postel, Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2017). Khalil F. Osman, Sectarianism in Iraq: Making of State and Nation since 1920 (New York: Routledge Press 
2015).   
 
3 Juan Ricardo Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi’ite Islam (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2002. Sabrina Mervin, Shia Worlds and Iran (London; In association with Institut Français du Proche-
Orient, 2010). Seyyed Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: 
Norton, 2006). 
 
4 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security 1984-1987: Strategic Implications and Policy 
Options, (London: Jane’s, 1987). Steven Hurst, The United States and Iraq since 1979: Hegemony, Oil and War 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 
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disproportionate role in shaping American perceptions of Iraqi Shi‘a sectarianism, especially 
during the Iranian Revolution.  
This paper begins by examining the historiography of Iraq that denies Sunni-Shi‘a 
conflict in Iraq as primordial or inevitable and identifies political and economic contingencies 
affecting sectarian relations. The historiography also disabuses notions of Shi‘a sectarianism as 
divisive within Iraq, yet a source of unity among Shi‘a across the Iran-Iraq border. Building upon 
previous scholarly efforts that question the Iraqi sectarian divide and refocusing seemingly 
sectarian conflict on other causal factors, I then turn my attention to the process through which 
American diplomats increasingly equated Shi‘a identity with political dissent. Implicit within 
this process is American diplomats disregard or devaluation of competing means of identity for 
those identified as “Shi‘a.” Thus American diplomats decreasingly identified Shi‘a as Iraqi, or 
Arabs. Instead, American reports originating from 1958 to 1979 increasingly emphasize 
sectarian identities and ignored alternatives based on nationality or ethnicity. This tendency 
proved especially true during times of political turmoil in neighboring Iran and peaked during the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979.  
In the late 1950s, when Iraqi revolutionaries deposed the Iraqi monarchy and established 
a new government, American diplomats were aware of sectarian differences within Iraqi society, 
but overlooked Iraqi Shi‘a while focusing on regional strategic concerns, such as the spread of 
communism, despite the Shi‘a’s majority status among the Iraqi population. From the early 
1960s to mid-1970s, American diplomats reported on limited Shi‘a dissidence but disregarded 
Iraqi Shi’a political demands as religious and sectarian in nature, unaware of degree of political 
organization taking place among part of the Shi’a community in southern Iraq. Overwhelmingly, 
American analysis from this period was preoccupied with maintaining access to oil, countering 
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the Soviets, and cautiously monitoring Egyptian President Gamal Nasser’s growing influence in 
the region. By misattributing Iraqi Shi’a political organization as to religious reasons, American 
diplomats missed the nascent political movement occurring among elements of the Iraqi Shi’a 
population. Thus when the social turmoil proceeding the Iranian Revolution occurred, American 
diplomats feared that the seemingly sudden dissidence among Iraqi Shi’a was a result of Iranian 
interference, Iraqi Shi’a identification with the political movement in Iran, or a contagion affect 
through a homogenous trans-border Shi’a body. In actuality, the Shi’a political dissidence and 
increased levels of violence were the logical outgrowth of indigenous Shi’a political organization 
occurring over the previous twenty years. American diplomats’ fears of trans-border Shi’a 
solidarity undermining Iraqi stability crystalized in 1979 during the Iranian Revolution, which 
undermined numerous American strategic goals in the region, and brought about the trauma of 
the Iranian hostage crisis, which left American policy makers impotent against Revolutionary 
Iran for over a year.   
Documents archived by the United States Department of State and intelligence agencies 
depict changing American diplomatic priorities, concerns, and efforts abroad. Drawing upon 
these resources, I trace diplomatic cables, intelligence estimates, and other reports to understand 
how and why American diplomatic perceptions of Shi‘a Iraqis developed from 1958 to 1979. To 
demonstrate American misperceptions of Iraqi Shi‘a communities and political organizations, I 
contrast my primary sources with number of excellent scholarly works documenting the rise of 
the Shi‘a political Islamist movements in Iraq. This contrast demonstrates the gap between 
American diplomats’ analysis of Shi‘a dissent as motivated by religious sensibilities and the 
actual political nature of Shi‘a dissent. American diplomats were unaware of the growing Shi’a 
political movement identified in in the secondary literature. These errors eventually contributed 
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to a false equivalency between Iraqi Shi‘a dissidence and the revolutionary movement among 
Iranian Shi‘a.  
A Theory of Sectarianism 
Brian R. Wilson, in a theoretical study of modern sectarianism, defines “sect” as “likely 
to comprise only a very small proportion of a society’s total membership” whose adherents are 
“divergent in doctrine, practice, social ethos and form of socialization.”5 While Iraqi Shi‘a 
comprise a majority of the population in Iraq, Shia are a significant minority among Muslims, 
and Shi‘a orthodoxy and orthopraxy significantly diverge from Sunni norms, thus the Shi‘a are 
recognized as a sect within the Islamic tradition. Wilson’s static definition of sectarian identity, 
while a helpful starting point, fails to fully articulate the role of group identity in sectarianism. 
Here Ali al-Wardi, a prominent Iraqi sociologist, is useful: “sectarianism is not a religious [form 
of belonging], rather it is a form of tribal belong to a sect or particular person. When a sectarian 
person expresses solidarity to a sect he does not concern himself with the moral and spiritual 
principles of that sect .. all that concerns him is loyalty to the group and enmity to the other.”6 In 
the pages that follow, I suggests that this sense of belonging and group identity articulated by al-
Wardi are not fully reflected by Iraqi Shi‘a during the period of study, from 1958 to 1979. 
                                                             
5 Bryan R. Wilson, The Social Dimensions of Sectarianism: Sects and New Religious Movements in Contemporary 
Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 1.  
 
6 Ali al-Wardi, Lamahat Ijtima’iya min Tarikh al-Iraq al-Hadeeth (Social Aspects from Iraq’s Modern History) 
quoted from Fanar Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, pg 25 for accuracy of translation. For more information on Ali al-
Wardi, a prominent Iraqi Shi‘a sociologist, see Orit Bashkin “Advice from the Past: Ali al-Wardi on Literature and 
Society” in Writing the Modern History of Iraq. For a conversation between American diplomats and al-Wardi, see 
American Embassy, Baghdad, to Department of State (DoS), telegram (tel) #A-1008, 16JUN64, SOC 2 IRAQ, Box 
3226, Central Foreign Policy Files (CFPF) 1964-66, RG 59, National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA), College Park, Maryland (CP MD). 
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Further exploration into the theory of sectarianism emphasizes the fluid and contextual nature of 
group identities.7   
Both definitions above treat sect as definite and immutable. However, Fanar Haddad’s 
recent work offers a new theoretical approach for understanding the varied dynamics of sectarian 
identity in Iraq. Haddad rejects two opposed but common approaches to understanding sectarian 
identity in Iraq: the Iraqi nationalist approach that denies sectarian tensions and the American or 
European understanding that equates sectarian differences with insurmountable conflict. Instead, 
Haddad argues, sectarian identity in Iraq is fluid, constructed and constantly under negotiation 
with outside factors. He identifies sectarian identity in Iraq as belonging in one of three 
categories:  assertive, passive, and banal. These categories exist along a spectrum and offer a 
“barometer … of the salience of sectarian identity.”8 First, Haddad articulates assertive 
sectarianism as active displays or embracing a sectarian identity without referencing the sectarian 
“other.” Within assertive sectarianism there exists aggressive sectarianism or a display of 
sectarian identity accompanied by blatant attacks or animosity towards the sectarian “other.” 
Second, passive sectarianism only identifies with the sectarian identity when contextually 
provoked, such as by social obligations towards religious observations. Passive sectarianism 
contains apologetic sectarianism in which a person is uncomfortable or hesitant to display a 
sectarian identity. Third, banal sectarianism is that latent form of sectarian identity that is not 
actively expressed. Haddad argues that Iraqis, both Sunni and Shi‘a, move along the spectrum, 
                                                             
7 For greater detail on the terms “sect” and “sectarian” in context of the Middle East, see Fanar 
Haddad, “‘Sectarianism’ and Its Discontents in the Study of the Middle East.” Middle East Journal, Volume 71, No. 
3, Summer 2017.  
 
8 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, 25.  
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embracing different notions of sectarianism in response to external factors, though banal 
sectarianism often proved dominant in Iraq.9 
In Iraq, Shia identity was often mobilized and negotiated not in conflict with strict 
adherents to Sunni Islam, but with the Iraqi state. Nader Hashimi and Danny Postel contend that 
authoritarian states seek legitimacy and survival by “manipulating social and political cleavages 
via a divide-and-rule strategy.”10 The Iraqi state often discredited Shi‘a political grievances and 
complaints of discrimination by dismissing Shi‘a detractors as shu’ubiya, a charge of Iranian and 
Persian loyalty contrary to Arab solidarity and identity, or the intersection “where racial fears 
came together with sectarian animus.”11 The Iraqi state forced its Shi‘a citizens to defend their 
Arab identity, but Sunni Iraqis did not undergo a similar process. Moreover, in Haddad’s 
articulation, the Iraqi state embraced Sunni symbolism that directly countered symbols embraced 
by Shi‘a Iraqis, with both sets of symbols centered on differing historical traditions and heroic 
figures.12 Shi‘a Iraqi sectarian identity was thus provoked by the state while the state 
simultaneously forbid expressions of sectarian identity.13 These dynamics, of the Iraqi state 
provoking responses of sectarian identity, are illustrated in the pages ahead.   
Finally, before moving to historiography, a note on the term “Iraqi Shi‘a” serves as a 
valuable preliminary to this discussion. The unexamined replication of this term obscures deeper 
nuances of identity in Iraq. “Iraqi Shi‘a,” while frequently employed as a useful category of 
analysis, within both this work and others, is inherently inaccurate. This term emphasizes a 
                                                             
9 Ibid, 25-27.  
 
10 Hashemi and Postel, Sectarianization, 8-10.  
 
11 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, 44 and Osman, Sectarianism in Iraq, 221. 
 
12 Ibid., 33-40.  
 
13 Ibid., 33.  
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homogenous sectarian identity, while disregarding national and ethnic forms of identity that exist 
alongside sectarianism as a salient means of group identification. I chose to employ the phrase 
“Iraqi Shi‘a” as shorthand to avoid bulky phrases while discussing American perceptions of 
sectarian categories in Iraq. However, it is necessary to distinguish between categories of 
analysis versus categories of practice: “Iraqi Shi‘a” as a category of analysis reflects my sources 
and the American perceptions of Iraqi Shi‘a as the object of my analysis. Nonetheless, I 
recognize that “Iraqi Shi‘a” is not a category of practice and acknowledge the limitations and 
disadvantages of the term. I consciously include indicators of both national and sectarian identity 
as an implicit reminder of competing forms of identity available to the denizens of Iraq and am 
attentive to the heterodox nature of Iraqi society.14 
The broad use of Iraqi Shi‘a as a category implies notions of group unity in thought and 
action, a concept that undermines the agency and personal motivations possessed by individual 
Iraqi men and women. Diversity and divisions did and do exist within the Iraqi Shi‘a 
population.15 For example, the Shi‘a communities’ response to class and socioeconomic 
differences resulted in division over communist ideology. Disenfranchised Iraqi Shi‘a youth 
often embraced communism as an antidote to social, economic, and political ills, but the older, 
religious generation generally rejected communism due to its secular orientation.16 This 
distinction resulted in varied levels of support to the Iraqi government among the Shi‘a 
                                                             
14 Dina Rizk Khoury, “The Security State and the Practice and Rhetoric of Sectarianism in Iraq,” International 
Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Dec. 2010), p. 325. 
 
15 For a more comprehensive coverage of this topic, see Graham E. Fuller and Rend Rahim Franke, The Arab Shiʼa: 
the Forgotten Muslims (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 21-26.  
 
16 Ibid., 92-93 and Ahmad Naderi, Shia Geopolitics and Political Islam in the Middle East (Potsdam: WeltTrends, 
2015) 290-91.  
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population.17 Moreover, Shi‘a communities debated and disagreed upon theological issues. 
Ayatollah Khalisi’s denouncement of traditional differences between Sunni and Shi‘a rituals of 
worship, in an effort to encourage inter-sectarian relations, prompted widespread disagreement 
among leaders in the Iraqi Shi‘a community. This controversy later resulted in physical violence 
between the differing parties.18  
The History of Sectarianism in Iraq 
This work joins that of scholars who de-emphasize commonly held beliefs of both the 
inevitability of Sunni-Shi‘a conflict on sectarian grounds within Iraq and the inherent 
connectivity and loyalty between Iraqi and Iranian Shi‘a communities. The relationship between 
Iraqi and Iranian Shi‘a is a matter of debate among scholars of Iraqi and Islamic history. Scholars 
such as Abbas Kelidar argue that tribes in what is now Iraq converted to Shi’ism beginning in the 
eighteenth century, leading to a long period of Shi‘a relations across Ottoman and Persian 
imperial boundaries.19 Most scholars, including Yitzhak Nakash and Hanna Batatu, however, 
contend that most of the Arab tribes in Iraq that converted to Shi’a Islam did so in the nineteenth 
century simultaneous with a transition from a nomadic to an agricultural lifestyle. This social 
transition brought the nomadic Arab tribes into contact with the Shi‘a elite residing in Karbala 
and Najaf, both home to the shrines of Shi‘a saints and venerated by Shi‘a faithful.  The later 
development of Shi‘a religiosity and rituals in Iraq allowed expressions of Shi‘a faith to develop 
independent of those in Iran and limited trans-border ties of shared sectarian faith. Nakash draws 
                                                             
17 American Embassy, Baghdad, to DoS, tel #A-452, 29OCT62, 787.00/10-2962, Box 2085, Central Decimal File 
(CDF) 1960-1963, RG 59, NARA, CP MD.  
 
18 American Embassy, Baghdad, to DoS, despatch (desp) #245 & #634, 6OCT55 & 16JUN55 respectively, 
887.413/10-655 & 887.413/6-1655, Box 4962, CDF 1955-1959, RG 59, NARA, CP MD.  
 
19 Abbas Kelidar, “The Shii Imami Community and Politics in the Arab East,” Middle Eastern Studies, 19, No. 1 
(Jan. 1983), 3-16.  
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on differences in Iraqi and Iranian Shi‘a interactions with the state, religious education in the 
madrasa, burial practices, and financial support of shrine cities to demonstrate the differences 
between these forms of Shi’ism, which created separate traditions, loyalties, and organizational 
forms in both Iran and Iraq.20   
In Iraq, Sunni and Shi‘a differences were significantly exacerbated by Ottoman and 
British colonial rule. Historian Khalil Osman locates the origins of Sunni-Shi‘a sectarian 
tensions in the creation of the modern Iraqi nation state under the British Mandate. British 
colonial administrators built upon the legacy of the Ottoman Empire by favoring the urban Sunni 
elite as local leaders, even in predominately Shi‘a areas, provoking complaints and frustration 
among the Shi‘a majority during the early years of the Mandate.21 Iraqi Shi‘a tribes later 
instigated and fought in the 1920 Iraqi Revolution against the British. The British quelled the 
Iraqi Revolution at the direct cost of over 40 million pounds and thousands of casualties.22 These 
costs translated into a loss of political capital at home for the British population struggling to 
recover in the wake of World War I. Consequently, the Iraqi Shi‘a did not endear themselves to 
their colonial overseers. King Faisal, installed as the Iraqi king after an abortive rule in Syria, 
acknowledged the need to create a unified Iraqi identity, but was unwilling or unable to 
relinquish the Sunni monopoly on power within the British administered mandate.23 This process 
                                                             
20 Yitzhak Nakash, The Shiʻis of Iraq (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 4-8. Hanna Batatu, “Shi’I 
Organizations in Iraq: al-Da‘wah al-Islamiya and al-Mujahidin” in Shi’ism and Social Protest, Juan Ricardo Cole 
and Nikki Keddie, editors (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986) 186-187.  
 
21 Osman, Sectarianism in Iraq, 69.  
 
22 Abbas Kadhim, Reclaiming Iraq: The 1920 Revolution and the Founding of the Modern State, (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 2012) 1.  
 
23 Osman, Sectarianism in Iraq, 70.  
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of state building under the mandate system prevented “sectarian solidarities from congealing into 
a seamless Iraqi national identity.”24  
While Osman is correct regarding the absence of a “seamless” Iraqi national identity, 
many scholars argue for the existence of an Iraqi national identity throughout the 20th century. 
Reidar Visser allows for the existence of sectarian notions, but argues that there existed an 
overarching sense of Iraqi nationalism and desire for unity in Iraq. He traces Iraqi intellectual 
history during the 1920s and documents frequent references to ideals of Iraqi unity in political 
discourse almost a century ago. Visser concludes by arguing that sectarianism in Iraq exists, but 
is frequently overstated by those in and outside the region, while the history of Iraqi nationalism, 
incorporating both Sunni and Shi‘a, is often overlooked. 25 Hanna Batatu references the chaos 
surrounding the World Wars as instrumental in developing a sense of Iraqi national community 
among Sunni, Shi‘a, and Kurdish Iraqis.26 Finally, Fanar Hadad argues that challenge for an Iraqi 
national identity in Iraq was due to a multiplicity of notions of Iraqi nationality, not an absence 
of national identity.27  
 Other historians of Iraq take a conjunctural approach to articulate outside factors, 
primarily those involving economic and social changes, which influence seemingly sectarian 
divides.28 In his seminal work, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 
                                                             
24 Ibid., 49.  
 
25 Reidar Visser, “Ethnicity, Federalism and the Idea of Sectarian Citizenship in Iraq: A Critique” International 
Review of the Red Cross 89, no. 868 (December 2007), 809-822. 
 
26 Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1978) 22-30.  
 
27 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, 32-35.  
 
28 I am indebted to Faleh Abd al-Jabar for creating the category “conjunctural approach” to describe the scholars 
discussed below. Faleh Abd al-Jabar, The Shi’ite Movement in Iraq (London: Saqi, 2003).  
 
   
12 
 
Hanna Batatu analyzed British and Iraqi archives during the 1960s and 1970s. Batatu takes a 
Weberian and Marxist approach to class, and in doing so, provides additional clarity on the 
question of Sunni and Shi‘a division. The revolutions and coups that took place in 1958 and 
1963 disrupted structures of power and class, exacerbating socioeconomic differences between 
Sunni and Shi‘a.29 Iraqi Shi‘a often self-identified as “underdogs” in Iraqi society, which was as 
much a result of economic and political factors as it was of sectarian division.30 Batatu 
concludes, “the picture was much less simple than a purely sectarian interpretation would 
suppose.”31 Class and economic disparities map onto the Sunni-Shi‘a landscape opaquely, 
clouding the difference between sectarian and class division.32 
Marion Farouk Sluglett and Peter Sluglett offer a similar argument with a geographic 
approach.  Iraqi Shi‘a generally originated from the tribes of Southern Iraq, a traditionally poor, 
rural area. As they migrated to economic opportunities in Baghdad, they created Shi‘a slums and 
began to comprise the majority of the urban poor, segregated along spatial bounds from both 
established Sunnis communities and financially successful Shi‘a. Sunni Arabs have enjoyed 
                                                             
29 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, 807.  
 
30 Ibid., 983. 
 
31 Ibid., 985. 
 
32 Naderi, Shia Geopolitics and Political Islam in the Middle East, 237-238, 263.  Many historians of colonial rule 
find the roots of sectarianism, or ethnic violence, in the colonial “divide and rule” approach.  For a similar approach 
to the colonial roots of sectarianism in Lebanon see Ussama Samir Makdisi The Culture of Sectarianism: 
Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-century Ottoman Lebanon (Berkeley: University of California 
Press 2000). Mark Farha argues that Makdisi overstates the colonial origins of sectarian divisions and claims that 
“only a nuanced analysis blending considerations of past and present confessional ideologies and class interests, as 
well as political instrumentalization of sectarian identity by both external and internal actors, may allow us to better 
comprehend the vigor of communalism in the present day.” (“Searching for Sectarianism in the Arab Spring: 
Colonial Conspiracy or Indigenous Instinct?” The Muslim World, 106:1, January 2016, 8-61).  
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greater economic opportunity, thus creating divisions between the economically successful and 
the extremely poor that are easily misunderstood as sectarian in nature.33 
Ultimately, Iraqi Shi‘a embraced leftists politics, unions, and communism as an antidote 
to their general disenfranchisement and vigorously resisted the secular, amoral nature of 
communist in favor of traditional Islamic beliefs. Iraqi Shi‘a were adverse potential Iraqi 
membership in the United Arab Republic, led by Egyptian President Gamal Nasser, which would 
undermine their status as an Iraqi majority and embraced Arab nationalism as an inclusive, post-
colonial identity. Iraqi Shi‘a embraced the antagonistic poles listed above, and fell on a spectrum 
between the two. In short, Iraqi Shi‘a were anything but monolithic. Simple notions or popular 
concepts of loyalty or conflict based upon sect alone are disproven by co-determinate social 
factors and differing historical traditions. Sectarian division within Iraq and trans-border 
connections on confessional grounds are historically and politically contingent, not an inherent 
consequence of differences or similarities of theology.  
   
  
                                                             
33 Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2001), 191. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE BEGINNINGS OF AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF SHI‘A 
SECTARIANISM: QASIM REGIME, 1958-1963 
 
In 1957, the United States Congress passed a resolution to provide military and economic 
assistance to countries across the Middle East. The details of the resolution, later known as the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, endeavored to accomplish the following American strategic objectives: 
continued access to oil imports, prevent Soviet influence into Middle Eastern countries, decrease 
the appeal of communism, deflate the appeal of the non-alignment movement which peaked in 
the mid-1950s at the Bandung Conference, and decrease growing Arab nationalism led by 
Egyptian President Gamal Nasser. While the Eisenhower Doctrine included a number of aims, 
the primary American goal was to prevent Soviet control over oil trade in the Middle East.34 The 
Eisenhower Doctrine lays the foundation for the American approach, goals, and outlook in Iraq 
during the following period.  
The year 1958 brought about a revolution in Iraq, altering both internal relations between 
the Iraqi state and its citizens and external relations among Iraq and its neighbors.  While pre-
1958 frustrations with the Iraqi monarchy and prime minister are beyond the scope of this paper, 
the Revolution of July 14, 1958 is a transition point in Iraqi history. The coup of Abd al-Karim 
Qasim demolished the Iraqi monarchy, established by Great Britain, and with it, the vestiges of 
western control in Iraq. After the Revolution, Qasim’s government established relationships with 
China and the Soviet Union, rejecting the tradition of British and Western influence in Iraq.35  
                                                             
34 For an excellent study on the Eisenhower Doctrine, see Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: the 
Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2004).  
 
35 Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, Iraq Since 1958, 50. 
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For this reason, the Revolution serves as a logical starting point for evaluating American 
diplomatic perceptions of Iraqi Shi‘a sectarianism. Qasim and his cabal of Free Officers swept to 
power accompanied by the hope and optimism of lower and middle class Iraqis, Sunni and Shi‘a 
alike. Not only was Qasim the son of mixed Sunni-Shi‘a parentage, but he also promised 
improvements for the working and lower classes, significant advantages to the economically 
disenfranchised Shi‘a.36   
American diplomatic cables evaluating the July Revolution focus on the political, 
regional, and international implications of the event and do not mention Iraqi Shi‘a or 
sectarianism more specifically.37 Thus American diplomatic cables demonstrated a lack of 
preoccupation with the Shi’a population and no perceptions of the Shi‘a as a significant dissident 
group, even during a time of great political instability. Nevertheless, the focus of diplomatic 
cables is still telling. These documents provide insights into American interests in the region, 
American understanding of Iraqi society, and provide a baseline from which to evaluate future 
changes in American perceptions of Iraqi Shi‘a.  
American diplomats and analysts in the embassy in Baghdad and consul in Basra were 
fully aware of the Shi‘a element of Iraqi society. In the mid-1950s, American diplomat 
composed reports on Shi‘a observations of Muharram, a singularly Shi‘a religious holiday, 
efforts of a Shi‘a cleric to unify Iraqis from both Sunni and Shi‘a backgrounds, and included the 
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sectarian identifications in a report on political prisoners.38 American diplomats, did not, identify 
the Iraqi Shi‘a as a significant political force.  
Qasim was not a true communist. Early in his rule, he commanded significant support 
from the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) but distanced himself from the party as he solidified his 
leadership in Iraq. Qasim halted the ICPs independent efforts and extended his personal political 
control over Iraq through a vast patronage network.39 American diplomats in Baghdad, however, 
preoccupied themselves with Qasim’s link to communism. Congruent with the Eisenhower 
Doctrine, a majority of the cables from Qasim’s reign locate Iraq and the American-Iraqi 
relationship squarely within the Cold War binary, with the United States primarily focused on 
little beyond the role of communism within Iraq. American assessment repeatedly reference 
Qasim’s relationship with the ICP, and the alternately waxing and waning relationship between 
Iraq and the Soviet Union, and evaluate the influence of communist elements within Iraqi 
society. Less than a year after the Qasim Revolution, intelligence analysts assessed that a 
“creeping communist takeover” was taking place in Iraq which would soon become a “hidden 
satellite” of the Soviet Union, and had likely passed the “point of no return.”40 At a National 
Security Council meeting in April 1959, Vice President Nixon asked the Assistant Secretary of 
State, William Roundtree, if the United States could tolerate a satellite Soviet state in Iraq, which 
Roundtree answered in the negative. Another representative from the Department of State 
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reinforced Roundtree by comparing the situation in Iraq to the communist takeover occurring in 
Indochina.41 
In addition to communism, the United States was especially concerned with the impact of 
Egyptian President Gamal Nasser’s influence in Iraq. Nasser led the Arab world toward the non-
alignment movement that rejected the poles of American and Soviet leadership. In 1958, Egypt 
and Syria united to create the United Arab Republic (UAR), which dramatically increased 
Nasser’s influence in the region.42 American official’s early assessment of the Qasim Revolution 
attributed the coup to pro-Nasserist forces, though Qasim never aligned Iraq with Nasser’s UAR 
or fully embraced the Egyptian president’s leadership in the Arab world.43 A Special Intelligence 
Estimate further predicted “Nasser will seek by all means at his disposal to bring about a 
counterrevolution in Iraq.”44 On February 12, 1960, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director 
Allen Dulles briefed that many Iraqis believed their country to be at a decision point between 
communism and Nasserism.45 Similar to fears of communism, a Special National Intelligence 
Estimate warned that if capable, Nasser would implement further controls over oil resources in 
Arab lands.46 The American intelligence and diplomatic apparatus assessed that Iraq was torn 
between communist and Nasserist elements with the communist ideology enjoying a slight 
advantage. Nasser’s growing leadership in the Arab world and Iraqi interest in the pan-Arab 
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movement embodied by the UAR triggered apprehension among elements of the Shi‘a 
community. Many Iraqi Shi‘a embraced Iraqi nationalism, while rejecting the pan-Arab 
movement.47 Iraqi Shi‘a feared that Iraqi acceptance into the UAR or a similar majority Sunni 
pan-Arab state would undermine their majority status in Iraq and further diminish their limited 
political advantage.48  
While American diplomatic records demonstrate a lack of concern with Shi‘a resistance 
or unrest during Qasim’s early years. Cables do reference dissident movements in Iraq with the 
Kurds receiving the greatest attention.49 The Kurds, who generally inhabit northern Iraq, had 
agitated for varying degrees of autonomy or independence since the creation of the modern Iraqi 
state. Ongoing Kurdish frustrations with Iraqi rule allowed those inimical to Iraq to identify the 
Kurds as an ideal proxy force, and the Soviet Union occasionally instigated unrest among the 
Kurds to influence and destabilize Iraqi politics.50  
Iran, too, meddled in Iraqi affairs through the Kurds, not the Shi‘a, calling into question 
assumptions of trans-border Shi‘a solidarity.51 The absence of Iranian interference in Iraqi 
                                                             
47 Iraqi nationalism, especially among Shia Arabs and non-Arab minorities, is a matter of debate among academics. 
Hala Fattah successfully contends there was widespread sense of Iraqi nationalism during the Iraqi monarchy that 
overwhelmed other forms of identity, including those sectarian in nature. See “What did it mean to be Iraqi during 
the Monarchy” published in Jordi Tejel et al., Writing the Modern History of Iraq: Historiographical and Political 
Challenges, (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, 2012). Also see Magnus T. Bernhardsson, “Digging the Past – 
Historiography of Archaeology in Iraq” in the same volume for a study of Ba’athist efforts to use Mesopotamian 
history to further of Iraqi nationalism and create a sense of history predating the Iraqi state.  
 
48 Yitzak Nakash, “The Nature of Shi’ism in Islam,” in ʻAbd al-Jabār, Fāleḥ. Ayatollahs, Sufis and Ideologues: 
State, Religion and Social Movements in Iraq, (London: Saqi, 2002). Fanar Hadad rejects this reasons for Iraqi Shi‘a 
resistance to Nasser’s version of pan-Arabism. Haddad contends that the pan-Arab movement was incongruous with 
Shi‘a myth-symbol complexes and pan-Arab suspicious toward Shi‘a Irabs. See Fanar Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, 
38.  
 
49 FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, document 142, “Memorandum from the Director of Intelligence and Research 
(Cummings) to Secretary of State Dulles,” 5NOV58.  
 
50 Ibid.  
 
51 FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XII, document 223, “Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board,” 
14DEC60.  
   
19 
 
internal affairs through the Iraqi Shi‘a population was not due to a lack of effort by Iranian 
diplomats. In January 1959, the Iranian Charge de Affairs to Iraq, Malayery, discussed Iranian 
efforts towards Iraqi Shi‘a with the American Ambassador to Iraq. Malayery claimed close 
contact with Iraqi Shi‘a Ayatollah Muhsin Hakim and asserted that Iraqi Shi‘a were increasingly 
frustrated with the Qasim government. The Charge de Affairs went on to suggest that the Iraqi 
Shi‘a needed external support from Iran.52 Iranian diplomats claim of intimacy or insight into the 
Iraqi Shi‘a population is a trend that continues in the following decades. However, Iranian use of 
Kurdish, not Shi‘a, proxy forces during the Qasim Regime casts doubt on both the narrative of a 
strong trans-border Shi‘a alignment and presumed Iranian-Iraqi Shi‘a loyalty on religious 
grounds.  
A lack of Iraqi Shi‘a sectarianism did not equate to internal stability and peace within the 
Iraqi population. A memorandum of discussion from the National Security Council references 
unrest among Iraqi tribes along the Syrian, Turkish, and Iranian borders and blames the Syrians 
and Turks for inciting instability in Iraq through tribal intermediaries.53 While the memorandum 
does not state the sectarian identity of the tribes, their location along the Syrian border indicates 
that the tribes were likely Sunni, given the Shi‘a majority was located south of Baghdad or in the 
capital. Another report mentions a serious riot between the communist and security forces in an 
unnamed southern town on July 10, 1959, but sectarian identity was again unmentioned, as 
communist ideology proved more significant than sectarian identification.54  
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While the documents that focused on communism and do not mention Iraqi Shi‘a 
explicitly, historically there exists a connection between Iraqi Shi‘a and the ICP, a fact 
unmentioned in American reporting. The Iraqi Shi‘a comprised a large proportion of the poorest 
and most disenfranchised members of Iraqi society. As such, communism’s promises of 
economic equality attracted Iraqi Shi‘a, especially the younger generations, and Iraqi Shi‘a 
comprised a significant number of ICP members.55 American reports identify the prevalence of 
unions and communist ideology in Basra, a majority Shi‘a area, but draw no connections 
between the prevalence of Shi‘a Iraqis and the communist organizations in Basra.56 Communism 
proved divisive along a generation fault line among Shi‘a populations. Older Shi‘a, especially 
religious leaders, rejected the amoral, secular elements of communism, and in January 1959, 
American officials penned a concerned report about the possibility of clashes between Shi‘a 
religious leaders and communist demonstrations.57 
The influences of secular political ideologies including communism and Nasser’s pan-
Arabism prompted an embryonic Islamic movement in Iraq. Various sources offer conflicting 
dates and narratives for the origins of Hezb al-Da‘wa al- Islamiya or the Islamic Call party, but 
scholars generally agree that the party gained prevalence during the early years of Qasim’s 
rule.58 Da‘wa called for a return to an Islamic form of government while rejecting growing Iraqi 
secularism but focused its efforts on education. Da‘wa began in Najaf as an intellectual 
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movement and only later transformed into a political party.59 Sayid al-Sadr, in conjunction with 
other reform oriented ulama, or religious scholars, created and led Da‘wa in its early years. 
Ayatollah al-Hakim is assessed to have given implicit consent for the creation of Da‘wa, on the 
grounds that it could not have come to fruition otherwise.60 During the same period, Ayatollah 
al-Hakim created the Jama’at al-Ulama or Society of Religious Scholars to strengthen the 
relationship between the ulama and the umma or Muslim community. Jama’at al-Ulama 
provided religious instruction in addition to meeting practical needs through health and welfare 
services.61 By 1960, a schism had arisen between the younger ulama involved in Da‘wa and the 
senior clerics, some of whom were members of Jama’at al-Ulama. Ayatollah al-Hakim rejected 
Da‘wa as divisive, and al-Sadr distanced himself from the organization he created.62  
Iraqi Shi‘a clerics’ resistance to secular ideologies transcended the spiritual realm and 
possessed a material element. Land reform efforts by the Qasim regime undermined traditional 
power structures and decreased financial support to Shi‘a religious seminaries and mosques in 
Karbala and Najaf.63 Furthermore, Qasim’s efforts towards education, development and 
modernization, combined with the appeal of communist organizations, undermined Iraqi 
religiosity and decreased the traditional influence Shi‘a religious leaders held over society.64 
Shi‘a clerics created Da‘wa, but fundamentally, its goals were socio-political, not religious or 
sectarian, and Da‘wa shifted away from its focus on education and toward political engagement. 
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Da‘wa drew inspiration from Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimim 
(Muslim Brotherhood) and later developed an alliance with the Iraqi Ikhwan al-Muslimim to 
work towards a unified Sunni-Shi‘a Iraqi government.65  
 American diplomats were unaware of Da‘wa and Jama’at al-Ulama but knew of 
conservative resistance to the Qasim regime, known as the Iraqi Islamic Party. In late March, 
1960 the Baghdad Embassy submitted a report on the Iraqi Islamic Party’s request for licensure 
and included a copy of the Party’s manifesto. Embassy staff dismissed the party as weak and 
unappealing to an increasingly secular society. The manifesto was described as “fuzzy” and zig-
zagging.”66 A month later, a report followed, documenting the Iraqi government’s licensure 
denial.67 The embassy, however, missed a critical detail by assessing the party as Sunni-led. The 
party was supported by elements of Hezb al-Da‘wa and Ikhwan al-Muslimim. Da‘wa leaders did 
not seek to achieve their goals through revolutionary means, but engaged in the Iraqi political 
process while the American embassy remained oblivious to the Shi‘a socio-political movement 
taking place.68   
For all of Qasim’s original promise, American diplomatic reporting soon indicated 
concerns about the viability and stability of his government. Qasim faced multiple coup attempts 
in 1959 and 1960. On November 1, 1960, in a National Intelligence Estimate, American analysis 
foretold that a “a coup attempt could occur at any time” - less than insightful analysis 
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considering the two proceeding attempts - and gave Qasim equal odds of surviving another coup 
versus meeting his demise.69 In a later memorandum written in 1962, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, James P. Grant, outlined the current political 
instability in Iraq under Qasim, Iraqi efforts to consolidate and centralize power, political threats 
facing the Iraqi government, and potential courses of action for an American response to a 
coup.70 In keeping with previous assessments of Qasim’s rule, Grant found no reason to mention 
concerns of unrest among Iraqi Shi‘a or the potential for Shi‘a political maneuvering during the 
chaos surrounding a coup.   
During the Qasim Regime, American diplomats identified and acknowledged the Shi‘a 
element of Iraqi society and Shi‘a clerical resistance to secular political ideologies. They were 
not, however, aware of the Da‘wa Party and Shi‘a efforts to work through political methods to 
create a conservative, Islamic Iraq. In keeping with the goals set forth in the Eisenhower 
doctrine, Department of State and intelligence agencies busied themselves with understanding 
and reporting on the dueling influences of communism and Nasser’s aggressive brand of pan-
Arabism. American analysts perceived violence between Sunni tribes and Iranian meddling 
through Kurdish aspirations for autonomy as threats to Iraqi political stability. During Qasim’s 
rule, however, American diplomats did not appraise Iraqi Shi‘a as a significant cause of dissent 
or a threat to Iraqi stability.   
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CHAPTER 3: THE ARIF BROTHERS REGIME, 1963-1968 
 
The long-expected coup occurred in 1963. Colonel Abdul Salam Arif, originally a 
member of Qasim’s Free Officers in 1958, overthrew Qasim and established a Ba’athist 
government in Iraq with the assistance of a cabal of Ba’athist and Arab nationalist leaders 
committed to Arab unity and pan-Arab nationalism.71 Colonel Arif drew support from Nasserists 
in Iraq and aligned himself with Nasser’s Arab nationalism, but Colonel Arif appeared especially 
attracted to the degree of power Nasser exercised over the Egyptian state, ideology aside.72 
While 1963 marks the beginning of Ba’athist Iraq, Colonel Arif devoted his efforts to self-
aggrandizement in an effort to forestall future coup attempts and was less concerned with 
promulgating Ba’athist ideologies.73 President Arif led Iraq for three years before his accidental 
death in 1966, when his brother, Abd al-Rahman Arif was chosen to assume the presidency.74 
During the leadership of both Arif brothers, Sunni chauvinism proved ascendant. Abdul Salam 
Arif often dismissed Shi‘a as shu’ubiya, denying their Arab and Iraqi identity, emplacing Iraqi 
Shi‘a in a defensive position vis-à-vis the Iraqi state.75 The governmental embrace of a distinctly 
Sunni Arab nationalism provoked a distinctly Shi‘a identity and alienated many Iraqi Shi‘a who 
rapidly became disenfranchised with the government.  
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The flurry of American reporting in the aftermath of the Arif coup reveals the same 
concerns and preoccupations expressed during the Qasim coup with no apparent fear of Shi‘a 
unrest during times of Iraqi instability and political disorganization.76 A memorandum from the 
National Security Council staff regarding the coup highlighted risks posed by the Kurds to the 
new regime and possibilities of Soviet and Iranian interference.77 Despite the social and political 
upheaval of the coup, trends in American diplomatic concerns and perceptions established during 
the Qasim regime continued throughout the rule of Colonel Abdul Salam Arif and Abd al-
Rahman Arif. 
  Iranian policy towards Iraq proved continuous despite the 1963 coup and Iran continued 
to mettle in Iraq through the Kurds. In northern Iraq, a Kurdish insurgency smoldered, as the 
Kurds continued their quest for greater autonomy. The Kurds, desperate for support from any 
quarter, accepted logistical and material assistance from Iran. In December 1964, Ambassador 
Strong telegrammed the State Department with an update and noted Kurdish sources claimed 
Iran was encouraging further Kurdish hostilities against the Iraqi state. The Ambassador warned 
Kurdish leaders to “avoid appearing as agents of others or acting in the interests of others.”78 
Strong then notes that it would be unwise to expect the Kurds to rebuff Iranian assistance in the 
face of increased pressure from the Ba’athist state. The United States pressured Iran to halt its 
aid to the Kurds and to preserve stability in Iraq and neighboring countries, but Iran proved 
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unresponsive.79 Desperate for assistance in the fight for autonomy from the Iraqi state, Kurdish 
leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani contacted Ayatollah Hakim, seeking support from the Shi‘a 
cleric. Ayatollah Hakim provided nominal assistance in the form of vocal opposition. He berated 
government ministers for the conflict in the Kurdish region on religious grounds but stopped 
short of issuing a fatwa, or religious degree, against the conflict as unacceptable violence 
between Muslims. He did not urge his followers to take any physical action against the regime or 
in support of the Kurds.80  
The Kurds were not alone in seeking assistance from Shi‘a leaders. Despite reliable co-
conspirators in the Kurds, Iran also attempted to recruit assistance from Iraqi Shi‘a in an effort to 
counter growing regional Arab power. Moreover, Iranian diplomats continued to underscore 
their relationship, even leadership, within the Iraqi Shi‘a community when meeting with 
American diplomats. In May 1964, during a meeting with Ambassador Strong, Mohamad Hosein 
Faridani the Iranian Ambassador to Iraq, insisted that members of the Shi‘a community 
approached him for political advice.81 Mehdi Pirasteh soon replaced Fardani as the Iranian 
Ambassador to Iraq, when Iran recalled the latter for a position in the Foreign Ministry.82 
Ambassador Pirasteh pursued relationships and influence with Shi‘a leaders more aggressively 
than his predecessor had. Soon after arriving in Iraq, during his initial meeting with Ambassador 
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Strong, Pirasteh reported that Iraqi Shi‘a businessmen requested his assistance in transferring 
money outside of Iran and “received reports daily of Shias organizing to overthrow the 
government.”83 Allegedly, Ambassador Pirasteh later visited Ayatollah Hakim and offered 
Iranian assistance to Iraqi Shi‘a in an effort to undermine the Iraqi government. Ayatollah Hakim 
reported Pirasteh’s offer to the government of Iraq and staunchly rejected the offer, informing 
Pirasteh that “Shi‘a in Iraq were Iraqis and neither wanted nor needed help from Iran.”84 
Iran significantly influenced American perceptions of Iraqi Shi’as. The Iranian Shah, 
Reza Pahlavi, was an integral American ally in the region until the Iranian Revolution in 1979. 
As a close ally, the Shah possessed an audience and influence with ranking American diplomatic 
officials and, occasionally, the President. Through this access, the Shah contributed to a 
misguided American understanding of connections between Iraqi and Iranian Shi‘a by repeatedly 
informing American diplomats that he had influence over his coreligionists in Iraq. During a 
1965 visit to New York, the Shah claimed that his “considerable assets in Iraq” included the 
Shi‘a and Kurds but noted that he was not using them for his own advantage.85 A year later, 
during a meeting with the Secretary of State, the Shah claimed there existed a special connection 
between Iranian and Iraqi Shi‘a.86 The Shah’s access to senior American officials and Iran’s 
integral role in American diplomatic efforts in the region likely gave his words disproportionate 
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influence on diplomatic thoughts, even as he overstated his leverage among the Iraqi Shi‘a 
population. Iranian efforts to recruit Iraqi Shi‘a, however, proved largely unsuccessful 
A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report produced in 1966 notes “the Iranians have attempted 
openly to win support among leaders of the Shi‘a minority Islamic group in Iraq.”87 Despite 
Iranian allegation to the contrary, shared religious tenets did not inherently translate into support 
for Iran or Shah Reza Pahlavi’s leadership efforts in the region and in February 1966, a Shi‘a 
cleric in Baghdad denounced the Iranian Shah and called for his ouster.88 
 Shi‘a dissidence under the Arif regime bubbled to the surface of Iraqi society during 
Muharram in May 1964. A traditional Shi‘a religious holiday and period of mourning for the 
death of Husayn, an early Shi‘a leader, Muharram rituals include self-flagellation and other 
intense displays of sorrow. Muharram and Ashura, the 10th day of Muharram, transformed into 
sites of Shi‘a frustration with the Sunni-dominated government. Charles Henebry, the American 
consul in Basra, characterized the Shi‘a criticisms of the Iraqi government as sectarian in nature, 
a statement indicative of an overarching tendency among Americans diplomats in Iraq to 
categorize as actions and statements in religious terms while disregarding the political nature of 
protest.89 Shi‘a complaints emphasized the lack of Shi‘a representation in government and the 
increasing secularism of the Arif regime. While both of these factors contain a religious element, 
they are also inherently political complaints regarding the nature of the Iraqi government, a 
factor ignored by American diplomats. Heneby continued his telegram by claiming that the 
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educated and elite in Basra disregarded “fanatical,” “narrow-minded” Shi‘a dissidence and 
“relegate the denominations of Islam to the ash heaps of history.” He goes on to claim that the 
educated Basrawi “regards himself as an Iraqi, an Arab, and a Moslem – in that order.”90  
Later that year, an embassy report exploring “Shi‘a Discontent” concluded with a quote 
from Gertrude Bell, a British colonial administrator who played a significant role in forming the 
Iraqi state under the Mandate system. Bell wrote in 1920 of Shi‘a religious leaders “There they 
sit in an atmosphere which reeks of antiquity and is so thick with the dust of ages that you can’t 
see through it – nor can they.” The author of “Shi‘a Discontent” quickly added to Bell’s quote: 
“Things would not appear to have changed very much, and we are doubtful that the futility of the 
Shi‘a is any less today than it had been in the past.”91 
 American reports continue to document Shi‘a political efforts to improve their lot under 
the largely Sunni regime but tended to dismiss their concerns. Ayatollah Hakim submitted a 
number of complaints to the Iraqi government, emphasizing his frustration with the lack of 
Shari’a law, discrimination in state hiring in favor of Sunni applicants, and the legality of 
alcohol, among other complaints. Embassy staff described Hakim’s concerns as largely 
“reactionary” and unlikely to resonate with the educated Shi‘a class.92 While Ayatollah Hakim 
disagreed with the Iraqi government over numerous and substantial issues, he continued to work 
for political change through non-violent methods that recognized and reaffirmed the Iraqi state. 
A year later, a Shi‘a politician, Mohammad Riza Shabibi, adopted a similar approach when he 
presented a memorandum to the Iraqi Council of Ministers. Shabibi decried multiple aspects of 
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Iraq political life, including secularism and discrimination against the Shi‘a population. Once 
again the Embassy staff largely disregarded Shabibi and claimed that “his influence, although 
real, now stems more from respect due to him as an elder statesman than from a possible role as 
a leader of an organized opposition, much less a potential rallying point for an underground 
opposition.”93  
 Shabibi may not have been a capable of organizing or leading an underground Shi‘a 
opposition movement, but one existed nonetheless. During the early years of the Arif regime, 
Da‘wa members expanded their influence beyond the predominately Shi‘a cities in the Iraqi 
south. Da‘wa members proselytized in Madinat al-Thawra, an impoverished Shi‘a neighborhood 
on the outskirts of Baghdad.94 Da‘wa gradually grew from among the clerical class and began to 
resonate through student and professional circles.95  While Ayatollah Hakim bluntly condemned 
the failures of the Arif government, his overall quietism led to frustration among younger Shi‘a 
who increasingly flocked to Da‘wa to express their frustrations with both the Sunni dominated 
regime and the inaction of religious leaders.96 Furthermore, the Arif regime’s prosecution of the 
Iraqi Communist Party led many Shi‘a formerly aligned with communism to seek political 
organization through Da‘wa.97 Although American officials acknowledged the Shi‘a religious 
leadership in southern Iraq, dissidence during Muharram, and Shi‘a frustrations with the Iraqi 
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government, reports from the Embassy and Consulate indicate no awareness of underground 
political organizational efforts of Shi‘a Iraqis through Da‘wa.  
 Colonel Abdul Salam Arif’s fascination with Egyptian President Gamal Nasser’s 
leadership style and widespread support from Iraqi pan-Arab nationalists heightened American 
fears of the pernicious effects of spreading Nasserist ideology. On 26 May, 1964 American fears 
seemed realized when Iraq and Egypt agreed to form a unified political command, a move 
paralleled by Egypt and North Yemen. The Unified Political Command sought to create 
economic, military, and political unification between Iraq and Egypt, though it never came to 
fruition.98 The Department of Near Eastern Affairs within the State Department dispatched a 
telegraph the embassies in Baghdad and Tehran evaluating the possibility of a “Nasser takeover 
in Iraq.” The State Department assessed a full union between the two Arab neighbors as 
improbable, but outlined a policy requiring “watchful waiting,” observing diplomatic relations 
between Iraq and Egypt, and tracking the number of UAR Soldiers in Iraq.99  
The American Consul in Basra quickly noted opposition among Shi‘a religious leaders to 
the movement towards unification between Egypt and Iraq.100 Members of the Shi‘a religious 
community were not alone in their opposition. Sunni Iraqis associated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood launched anti-Nasser protests and distributed pamphlets decrying Egypt’s execution 
of Sayid Qutb, a prominent founder and member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 
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Ayatollah Muhsin Hakim banded together with Sunni Islamists in calling for Qutb’s release in 
the weeks before his execution.101  
American assessments during this period often overstated Sunni-Shi‘a animosities and 
overlooked generations of Sunni- Shi‘a interrelationships, intermarriages, and peaceful 
cooperation. Terms such as “age-old Sunni-Shi‘a antipathy” and “age-old Shi‘a disgruntlement” 
suggests an oversimplified, religious, and essentialist approach to Iraqi Arab relations.102 Not 
only does this paradigm overstate the animosity between Sunni and Shi‘a, but it implies that 
Sunni Shi‘a relations were predetermined and primordial due to religious differences and denies 
the role of political and historical contingencies.  
Iraq ended diplomatic relations with the United States in 1967 due to American support 
for Israel during the Six Day War. American diplomats continued to produce reports on Iraq 
during this period and attempted to locate a coherent picture of political events in Iraq by piecing 
together reporting from regional newspapers, reports from allied countries with embassies in 
Iraq, and interviews with American citizens and foreigners visiting Iraq for business or scholarly 
pursuits. Embassy staff in Tehran and Beirut submitted reports on Iraq predicated on articles 
published by Lebanese journalist Edward Saad.103 They also interviewed an Exxon employee on 
economic and political developments in Iraq after his three day visit.104 Embassy staff in Amman 
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relayed impressions from an employee of the Greek embassy in Damascus.105 These disjointed 
methods provided Washington with more information about Iraq that it could otherwise obtain, 
but the inherent limitations exacerbated the lack of knowledge about social and civil factors in 
Iraq among analysts in the State Department and intelligence agencies.  
 Throughout the Arif period, American diplomats in Iraq preoccupied themselves studying 
Iraq’s relationship with Egypt and Nasser’s growing influence in the region. They were aware of 
Shi‘a dissidence and frustration with the increasingly chauvinistic Sunni government, but tended 
to disregard Shi‘a protests as weak, motivated by “age-old antipathies” of religion, and sect. This 
perception was furthered by Iranian diplomats’ repeated emphasis on Iranian influence over Iraqi 
Shi‘a and with an implicit claim of Shi‘a sectarian alliances superseding Iraqi national identity. 
Because they attributed Shi‘a dissidence to religion, American diplomats overlooked the political 
nature of Iraqi Shi‘a complaints. Although American diplomats noted a few political actions 
taken by Shi‘a leaders, including Ayatollah al-Hakim and Shabibi, notions of sectarian solidarity 
dominated their analysis and they remained unaware of Shi‘a political organization taking place 
in Iraq. This established the foundation that would lead to further misunderstandings of political 
organization of Iraqi Shi‘a in the future.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE AL-BAKR REGIME, 1968-1976 
Iraq suffered from a lack of leadership and national vision beginning with the death of 
President Abdul Salam Arif in 1966. After two years of weak national leadership from President 
Abd al-Rahman Arif, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, also a member of the Iraqi Ba’athist party, deposed 
President Arif in 1968 and claimed the mantle of leadership in Iraq.106 In an effort to escape the 
divisive Sunni chauvinism of the Arif regime and resolve sectarian differences, Ba’athist 
leadership embraced Iraqi nationalism. The new emphasis on Iraqi nationalism manifested itself 
as renewed attention to archeology and the ancient history of modern Iraq. Ba’athist leaders 
frequently referenced the Mesopotamian themes in political speech, connecting pre-Islamic 
history with modern Iraq. Connecting Iraqi nationalism to the glories of an ancient civilization 
allowed the Ba’athist regime to concoct a resonating political identity that superseded the recent 
origins of the modern Iraqi state, British influence in the region, and recent Arab divisions.107 
Inclusive appeals to Mesopotamian history also incorporated minority groups such as Kurds, 
Assyrians, and Jews into an Iraqi national identity based on an ancient civilization, not Arab 
ethnicity.108 
 Ba’athist leaders did not limit themselves to drawing on ancient history. As early as 1968, 
the Ba’athist government launched the Project for the Rewriting of History (Mashru Idat Kitabat 
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al-Ta’rikh). Political Scientist Eric Davis, in his highly regarded study of Iraqi national identity, 
articulates the Project as “an attempt to construct a new public sphere, including the 
reconstitution of political identity, the relationships of the citizen to the state and the public 
understanding of national heritage.”109 Through this project, among others, the Ba’athist 
government endeavored to consolidated power by creating a more coherent political body as 
compared to previous regimes. Despite rhetorical efforts for an inclusive Iraqi national identity, 
Iraqi Shi‘a were increasingly marginalized under the Ba’athist regime.  
 Simultaneously, political changes occurred due to economic factors. During the 1970s, 
the Iraqi economy, and thus state revenues, expanded dramatically. The Iraqi government 
nationalized the oil industry in 1972, just as the international demand for oil exploded. Iraq’s 
Gross National Product doubled from 1973 to 1974, and tripled from 1972 to 1976.110 The 
Ba’athist government, intent on consolidating power, quickly converted economic prosperity into 
a greater control over civil society, primarily through two methods. First the Iraqi public sector 
and bureaucratic state expanded and focused on domestic development projects, creating an 
expansive, salaried middle class who owed their livelihood to the state. Second, the Ba’athists 
simultaneously enlarged the oppressive elements of state power to enforce the authoritarian aims 
of the state where economic incentives were inefficient or unsuccessful.111 While a number of 
scholars, led by Kenan Makiya, emphasize the totalitarian aspects of the Ba’athist government, 
Iraqi leaders utilized both carrots and sticks to increase state control over the population.112  
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 In 1972, the United States resumed a tentative diplomatic relationship with Iraq by 
establishing an Iraq Interest Section in the Belgium Embassy. American Perceptions of Shi‘a 
sectarianism during this period did not diverge significantly from those of the previous decade, 
though the Shi‘a garnered slightly less attention than in the past, probably due to the diminished 
staff operating out of the Belgium embassy and the abolished consulate a Basra, located in the 
predominately Shi‘a south. American diplomatic reports indicate a clear differentiation of the 
Shi‘a in Iraqi society based on religious grounds but remained unconcerned with Shi‘a unrest or 
dissident movements in the early and mid-1970s.  
 A political study on Iraq, prepared by the CIA in 1973, devotes one sentence to the Iraqi 
Shi‘a, noting that their status as a political force in a majority Shi‘a country ruled by a Sunni 
minority but mentions no concerns about Shi‘a unrest or collusion with Iran.113 The same 
document also notes “we are not in a position to elucidate much more on Iraqi political 
dynamics,” a statement demonstrating the effects of the five-year break in diplomatic relations 
and consequent American absence in Iraq. 114 Three years later, the CIA possessed the capability 
and access to compose a more detailed report. This report devoted more attention to the Shi‘a, 
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but remained largely unconcerned with their impact, claiming, “the Shiahs (sic) of Iraq today do 
not represent a unified movement nor even a focus of opposition to the Baath regime. Their 
capacity for political action is limited and even constrained by recent government ventures.”115 
While the Shi‘a as a whole did not participate in a unified movement, it was a source of 
opposition to the Ba’athist government.  
A telegram from the Baghdad Interest Section, written in the interim between the reports 
mentioned above, dismissed any possibility of Shi‘a political leadership, describing the Shi‘a as 
“medieval” and “tribal.”116 Embassy staff used similar language to terms used to describe the 
Shi‘a Muharram rituals during the mid-1960s, when the Shi‘a were “fanatical” or “corybantic,” 
devoid of rationality.117 In this dismissive vein, later American reports noted that the Iraqi Shi‘a 
held a weak position politically and lacked external support.118 While this lack of external 
support is factually correct, Iranian offers of support were available, but rejected, as previously 
discussed.  
In 1964, the Iranian government expelled Ayatollah Khomeini, the future leader of post-
Revolution Iran, for his rhetorical attacks on Shah Pahlavi. After departing Iran, Khomeini 
arrived in Najaf to a contentious relationships with Ayatollah Hakim.119 While in Najaf, in 1970, 
Khomeini developed and taught his doctrine of wilayat al-faqih (velayat-e faqih when translated 
from Persian) which articulated justification for governance by Islamic jurists, later the 
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foundation for the government of revolutionary Iran after 1979. Wilayat al-faqih represented a 
significant theological innovation and proved controversial among the international Shi‘a 
community, including those in Najaf and Karbala, the southern Iraqi Shi‘a shrine cities.120 Many 
Shi‘a leaders in Iraq, including Ayatollah al-Hakim, rejected the doctrine on the grounds that it 
undermined traditional conservative Shi‘a theology and was not widely accepted among 
religiously observant Iraqi Shi‘a.121  
The growing organizational, bureaucratic, and repressive power of the Ba’athist state 
came down heavily on Da‘wa in the early 1970s. From 1972 to 1974, the Iraqi state executed 
five key Da‘wa leaders, including Sahib al-Dakhil. Simultaneously, and perhaps 
counterintuitively, Da‘wa expanded in the early 1970s, with hundreds of district committees 
taking root in the Baghdad area alone.122 However, by the middle of the decade the Ba’athist 
state made significant gains in repressing Da‘wa and similar organizations. The government 
deported approximately 60,000 Shi‘a Iraqi’s after accusing them of being Iranian foreigners.123 
As discussed earlier in the paper, Shi‘a religious identity, especially among the elite, was 
negotiated in contention with the government, not the Sunni observant. The Ba’athist 
government exploited sectarian differences and used sectarian language to attack and undermine 
the Shi‘a Islamic movement. The Shi‘a movement was less religious than political. It organized 
around mass politics, clamoring for political change for reasons of political preference and self-
interest, and a differing notion of the role of religion in politics. Many of the actions and beliefs 
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studied herein cannot be categorized as either religious or political, especially given Shi‘a calls 
for a religious government is an innately political and religious demand. Nonetheless, it is 
mistaken to disregard Shi‘a political movements as religious, or worse “sectarian” when they 
were also political in nature and were never in opposition to Sunni Islam. Joyce Wiley, in her 
study of Shi‘a movements in Iraq, argues that in her reading of hundreds of documents on the 
origins and history of the Islamic movement, she never found “derogation of Sunniism.124 
Moreover, Shi‘a political movements were not aligned with Iran and existed long before the 
Iranian Revolution took place. Finally, Shi‘a leadership called for a unified Iraq under Islamist 
leadership and never voiced a preference for Iraqi federalism or an autonomous Shi‘a region in 
the South. Shi‘a Islamist leaders embraced Iraq as a nation composed of Arabs and Kurd, Sunnis 
and Shi’s while demanding a different form of government.125 
Sticky notions of religiosity and religious forms of political leadership aside, it is also 
important to recognize self-interest as a motive inspiring Shi‘a political leadership, especially in 
the years prior to Ba’athist totalitarianism beginning in the early 1970s. The Arif regime’s 
nationalization practices undermined Shi‘a land endowments in Southern Iraq, damaging 
religious donations contributed to Shi‘a leaders from wealth landowners. Theologies of religious 
leadership aside, Shi‘a ulama watched as their traditional sources of power shrank and took 
action to reverse this course.  
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American diplomats continued to perceive Iraqi Shi‘a as weak and politically 
marginalized.  Unaware of Da‘wa and the Shi‘a political movement, the United States mimicked 
a trend previously established by Iran and the Soviet Union and leveraged the Kurdish autonomy 
movement to destabilize Iraq. In 1974, in an effort to distract Iraq and prevent Iraqi interference 
in American negotiations with Egypt and Syria towards establishing peace between Israel and 
the surrounding Arab states, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger devised a plan to work 
through Iran to arm the Kurdish resistance. Strife created by the Kurds and Iran kept Baghdad 
focused on threats closer to home.126 The Kurds, seeking assistance in their efforts against 
Baghdad, attempted repeatedly to unite with the Shi‘a against the Sunni-dominated Ba’athist 
state, but the Shi‘a rebuffed Kurdish requests.127 
The Iran-Iraq relationship improved significantly in 1975 with the signing of the Algiers 
Agreement. Through the treaty, Iran and Iraq settled ongoing border disputes and Iran agreed to 
halt assistance to Kurdish separatists in Iraq. While devastating for the Kurds, the Algiers 
Agreement led to unprecedented cooperation between Iran and Iraq until the Iranian Revolution 
in 1979.  The Agreement was popular with both Iranian and Iraqi Shi‘a as it allowed Iranian 
pilgrims to visit Iraqi religious shrines in Karbala and Najaf, an economic boon to the largely 
Shi‘a cities. Reciprocally, the Agreement allowed Iraqi Shi‘a to visit Iranian holy cities.128  After 
signing the Agreement, the Iraqi government embarked on a public relations campaign, 
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advertising both the success of the Agreement and its popularity among the population, Sunni 
and Shi‘a alike.129  
 The American-Iraqi relationship continued to improve throughout the 1970s, despite the 
absence of a formal ambassador or embassy. Taking office in 1977, President Jimmy Carter 
prioritized improving the relationship with Iraq, among other countries, early in his tenure. In 
April 1977, Sectary of State Cyrus Vance submitted a memorandum to President Carter outlining 
the way ahead for improving diplomatic relationships with Iraq and mentioning that Iraq, too, 
had insinuated interest in improved diplomatic cooperation. Vance suggested working through 
the Egyptian Foreign minister to initiate further rapprochement.130 The following month, Under 
Secretary of State Philip Habib traveled to Iraq for an initial meeting with the Iraqi Foreign 
Minister, Sa’dun Hammadi.131  
The relationship between the Iraqi state and society changed significantly during the al-
Bakr period. The state grew bureaucratically and economically, allowing the Ba’athist state to 
increase its security presence and eradicate numerous threats to the state, real and perceived, 
which took its toll on Da‘wa leadership. Nonetheless, American perceptions of Iraqi Shi‘a 
maintained the same course previously established. American diplomats were aware of Shi‘a 
frustration with the increasingly chauvinistic Sunni government but continued to disregard Shi‘a 
protests as religious and indicative of sectarian tendencies, despite the specific political nature of 
actions taken by Shi‘a leaders and the increasing authoritarianism of the Ba’athist state. Finally, 
                                                             
129 National Archives Central Foreign Policy Files, Department of State telegram, 141000ZMAR75.  
 
130 FRUS, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, eds. Kelly M. McFarland and Adam 
M. Howard (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), document 131, “Memorandum from Secretary of 
State Vance to President Carter,” 15APR77.   
 
131 Ibid., document 132, “Telegram from the Department of State Interest Section in Baghdad to the Department of 
State,” 18MAY77.  
   
42 
 
the paltry American diplomatic presence in Iraq, resuming in 1972, limited the American ability 
to understand social changes taking place within the Iraqi state. 
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CHAPTER 5: A CONTAGION FROM IRAN? 1977-1979 
 
Previously established American trends and interests in Iraq and the surrounding region 
changed dramatically beginning in 1977, largely as a result of the political uprisings in Iran that 
led to the Iranian Revolution and the eventual American loss of Iran as a critical ally in the 
Middle East. Before proceeding to this narrative, a brief background of the American alliance 
with Iran is useful.  
During the early 1960s, President John Kennedy pressured the Iranian Shah Pahlavi 
towards reform and modernization, hoping to forestall a Soviet-style revolution in Iran. Kennedy 
alternated between rewards of aid and assistance packages, and threats of withdrawing of 
American support when Shan Pahlavi proved recalcitrant or hesitant. The Shah’s top down 
“White Revolution” yielded both significant development achievements and widespread 
frustration among those disenfranchised by the social changes.132 President Jimmy Carter, 
elected in 1976, acknowledged the role of the White Revolution in creating a schism within 
Iranian society and urged Shah Pahlavi to loosen his authoritarian grasp and halt the regime’s 
widespread human rights abuses. The social disruption engendered by the reforms, regime 
corruption, disaffection among religious communities, and the perception that the Shah was little 
more than a toady for the United States led to anti-Pahlavi protests and the Iranian Revolution of 
1979.133  
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Simultaneously, the United States built an alliance with Saudi Arabia. As the British 
withdrew from the Persian Gulf, the United States sought a new ally in the region and turned to 
the Saudis. Eager to expand their regional influence, the Saudis agreed to provide stability and a 
pro-American influence. In exchange, the United States supplied Saudi Arabia with an array of 
military hardware. Thriving Saudi oil revenues allowed the Kingdom to expand their defense 
capabilities.134 By the mid-1970, the United States was heavily invested in the dual alliances with 
Saudi Arabia and Iran and relied on oil exports from both countries. Of the two, Americans 
perceived Iran as the more congenial ally as Iran harbored no animosity toward Israel and did not 
participate in the 1973 oil embargo.135  
Saudi Arabia and Iran both allied themselves with the United States and received 
handsome rewards in return, but the similarities between the two countries were limited. The 
conservative House of Saud upheld Islamic piety as the self-appointed guardians of Mecca and 
Medina, the two holiest cities for Muslims. Conversely, Iranian leaders drew ire throughout the 
Middle East for their friendly relationship with Israel. Independent of American alliances and 
foreign policy, Saudi Arabia and Iran competed for leadership in the Islamic world.136 In an 
effort to gain influence, Iran endeavored to build relationship with Shi‘a communities across the 
Middle East, as demonstrated by Ambassador Pirasteh’s efforts among the Iraqi Shi‘a 
community discussed above.137  
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 In 1977, American diplomats grew truly concerned with Shi‘a unrest in Iraq. This topic 
gradually dominated diplomatic reports from 1977 to 1979. While tensions between the Sunni 
government and Shi‘a were not new, Americans came to believe that growing unrest in Iran 
could precipitate a similar movement in Iraq.  
 Shi’a unrest in Iraq in 1977 began with the Safar Intifada, or uprising. Despite Iraqi laws 
banning mass gatherings, the Shi‘a ulama in Najaf organized a march from Najaf to Karbala, on 
February 5, 1977, to honor the martyred Imam Hussein. The march also served as a protest 
against the Ba’athist government and the latest round of execution of Shi‘a leaders.138 Elements 
of the Iraqi Army intercepted the marchers mid-way in the small village of al-Haydariyyah but 
defied orders to fire on the people and rebelled, joining in the movement, probably due to the 
high number of Shi‘a conscripts in the Iraqi Army.139 Later, hastily arriving Iraqi Army 
reinforcements with helicopter air support brutally suppressed the movement, halting the march 
to Karbala.140 The Iraqi Army arrested over 2000 people and dozens were killed. The Iraqi 
government referred to the event as a riot, even though the marchers were generally unarmed.141 
Further government punishment came swiftly. In the government response, Shi‘a religious 
organizations were dismantled, Islamic leaders fled Iraq, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s son was 
assassinated. 142 
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On February 19, 1977, the American Iraq Interest Section in the Belgium Embassy 
reported receipt of a political pamphlet detailing the catastrophic march from Najaf to Karbala. 
The tone of the American report indicates a mixture of surprise and uncertainty in pamphlet’s 
details:  
If claims of leaflet are true to any substantial degree, Iraqi government has a far bigger 
problem with Shia population than authorities will admit either publicly or privately to us 
via our usual source with close links to Iraqi intelligence. The very fact that such a leaflet 
is being circulated is a significant security lapse in a country where ownership of 
typewriters is tightly controlled, and overt reproduction facilities are almost non-
existent.143 
 
An American telegram sent ten days later describes the Iraqi government’s long-term 
response to the incident, convicting key perpetrators and sentencing them to death.144 The report 
concludes “the authorities appear to have stuffed the genii of Shia unrest back into the bottle” 
and later dismisses the incident as “socio-religious friction [that] was mishandled by local 
authorities in Najaf, [and] was then exploited by still unknown anti-regime elements” (italics 
mine).145 American diplomats’ dismissal of this incident is significant:  the following year, these 
events on the road between Najaf and Karbala formed a foundation for the growing American 
concerns over Shi‘a sectarianism in Iraq. American ignorance to the indigenous Islamist 
movement occurring in Iraq allowed them to dismiss the incident as “socio-religious friction” in 
the trend of denying the political elements of Shi‘a frustration with the Ba’athist government. It 
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is notable that American diplomats did not speculate or assume a connection to Iranian actors, 
which would change in the coming months.  
 In addition to punishing leaders of the uprising, the Iraqi government reacted by 
implementing structural and personnel changes. The Chief of Iraqi Intelligence, among others, 
was replaced almost immediately.146 The government then moved to reorganize the Iraqi military 
towards a smaller, more ideologically loyal force.147 Traditionally, Shi‘a conscripts comprised a 
majority of enlisted men in the Iraqi military, a likely explanation for soldiers’ unwillingness to 
fire on the Shi‘a protestors marching from Najaf to Karbala.148 The military also began 
eliminating the small number of Shi‘a officers, deemed untrustworthy due to their sectarian 
heritage.149  
 Here it is useful to refer to the theoretical understanding of sectarian identity articulated 
by Fanar Haddad and discussed early in the paper. Iraqi Shi‘a identity was provoked and 
negotiated not in conflict with Sunni observants or religious leaders, as is assumed by subsuming 
Shi‘a actions as “sectarian,” but in reaction to the government. While the government was 
largely dominated by Sunni Arabs, at its’ core, this conflict did not center on sectarian identity, 
and identities were not deployed in religious register, but a political one. The Iraqi government’s 
distrust and mistreatment of Iraqi Shi‘a exacerbated social divisions, and drove Shi‘a towards the 
Islamist political movement. It is inaccurate to dismiss tensions between the Iraqi government 
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and elements of the Iraqi Shi‘a communities as “age-old” conflict, the very response of 
American diplomats in Iraq. 
 The Iraqi state, led by President Bakr and General Saddam Hussein, used both carrots and 
sticks to maintain state control over the population, Sunni, Shi‘a, and Kurd alike. Late in 1977, 
during the Shi‘a religious observance of Muharram, General Hussein capitalized on the 
opportunity by visiting Shi‘a shrines in Najaf and Karbala, praying and meeting with Shi‘a 
leaders. In a well-publicized address, Hussein highlighted the respect with which the Ba’ath 
regime treated Shi‘a religious leaders and shrines. He then invoked the legacy and religious 
power of Shi‘a forefathers, stating, “Imam Ali, Imam Hussein and the rest of the illustrious 
righteous leaders of Islam were not only eminent leaders of Islam but were also our own 
forefathers,” striking words from a Sunni Iraqi. 150 American diplomats noted Hussein’s actions 
as “a display of piety rare among secular Ba’athists” and attributed the solicitude to “careful 
diplomacy” intent on improving relations with the Iraqi Shi‘a majority. 151  
Notably, during times of Shi‘a unrest the Iraqi state addressed Shi‘a discontent by 
developing infrastructure, housing, and other projects to improve the standard of living in Shi‘a 
dominated areas.152 The Iraqi government, through their actions, professed their belief in the 
necessity of social programs to assuage political divides created by the Sunni-led government’s 
exclusion of the Shi‘a from the largesse of the state.153  
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 Relative normalcy returned to Iraq in 1978, but the American Interest Section in Baghdad 
grew increasingly preoccupied with the Iran-Iraq relationship by the end of the year, concerned 
that unrest in Iran would affected the Shi‘a population in Iraq. In November, American diplomats 
wrote of Shi‘a unrest in Iran as if it were a contagion, worrying the unrest would “rub off” on 
religious conservatives in Iraq.154 They worried the infection of political unrest in Iran would 
spread throughout what they assumed was a homogenous trans-border Shi‘a body.  
Analytical discrepancies in American diplomatic reports emphasize the degree to which 
American perceptions of Iraqi Shi‘a sectarianism were as contingent upon events taking place in 
Iran as they were upon events among the Iraqi Shi‘a population. Diplomatic analysis evaluating 
the possibility of Iranian political discontent influencing Shi‘a unrest in Iraq referenced the 
conflict between the Iraqi Army and Shi‘a marchers on the road to Karbala the year prior, despite 
the absence of Iranian involvement.155 As discussed above, American analysis at the time placed 
blame upon the Iraqi government, not Shi‘a unrest, nor Iranian influence, concluding at the time, 
“there is good evidence that it was the overreaction of Iraqi authorities to plans for religious 
processions from Najaf to Kerbala.”156 A year later, American diplomats associated Iraqi Shi‘a 
unrest with Iranian influence, despite the absence of an Iranian connection and contradicting 
diplomatic analysis at the time of the event.  
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 Iraqi Shi’a began to command greater attention within the Department of State. In 
response to questions from Washington, the American Interest Section in Baghdad devoted an 
entire report to the Shi‘a population of Iraq, an unusual approach for a population group that only 
received a paragraph at most in reports on the Iraqi political situation filed only a few years 
before.157 The Shi‘a report, written on December 12, 1978, details Ba’athist government efforts 
to integrate the Shi‘a into government institutions and placate religious leaders through financial 
support, concluding, “The Shia has evolved into a fairly successful example of conflict 
management and ethnic politics.” Despite the positive tone of the report, it closed by reminding 
readers “the fear that Shia-based politico/religious dissidence might overflow Iran into Iraq is a 
serious one.”158 Indigenous Iraqi Shi’a dissidence, however, already existed in Iraq. 
 Iranian Shi‘a unrest coalesced around the religious leadership and “prophetic charisma” 
of Ayatollah Khomeini.159 Exiled from Iran in 1964 for inspiring dissent and denouncing Shah 
Reza Pahlavi’s White Revolution, Khomeini briefly visited Turkey before he settled in Najaf, 
Iraq.  Iraqi Shi‘a clerics viewed Khomeini as a rival to their leadership and disagreed with his 
political approach to Islam.160 Khomeini lived in Najaf until 1978, when Iraq and Iran, their 
relationship improved by the Algiers Agreement, jointly decided to remove Khomeini from their 
midst. Rejected by neighboring Arab countries, Khomeini settled in Paris in September 1978 
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where he received far greater media attention as he encouraged the Iranian opposition movement 
and called for Shah Pahlavi to be removed.161   
American fears of Iranian Shi‘a unrest infecting Iraq increased during the first six months 
of 1979 during the Iranian Revolution, an uprising which removed Shah Pahlavi from power and 
ushered in the rule of Ayatollah Khomeini, who rapidly returned to Iran from Paris. The 
American Interest Section in Baghdad began the year on a relatively sanguine note, however, 
writing on January 18: 
We have already reported (Baghdad 2560)162 that the hierarchical and political situation 
of the Shia in Iraq is not at all analogous to that of their co-religionaries in Iran. There are 
a number of major differences which tend to make the linkage between Arabs and 
Persians, who happen to profess the same branch of Islam, rather tenuous. Nonetheless, 
there is an affinity based on religion, and the Iraqi Shia can be expected to look with 
favor (at least) on the possibility that their lot might with an Islamic Republic next 
door.163 
 
This report is one of few references to alternative Iraqi forms of identity. The importance of 
ethnic Arab cohesion within Iraq, and historical conflict between Persians and Arabs was rapidly 
subsumed by American worries of Shi‘a sectarianism transcending the Iran-Iraq border.   
American concerns continued to grow in the early months of 1979 in response to turmoil 
in Iran. Occasionally diplomatic reports hedged their analysis, reporting that the Ba’athist regime 
was concerned about the spark of Shi‘a unrest, begun in Iran, igniting in Iraq.164 Other 
documents spoke directly to American concerns of a Shi‘a dissidence.165 In February, a State 
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Department employee from the Baghdad Interest Section was dispatched to the predominately 
Shi‘a city of Najaf, on Friday, the Muslim day of sermons and prayers, which had the potential to 
adopt a political tone.  The employee reported no visible indication of political unrest, extra 
regime security efforts, political slogans, or literature recognizing Ayatollah Khomeini, as one 
would expect given the theological differences between Da‘wa and the Ayatollah. 166 
Nonetheless, the Interest Section’s worries were not assuaged.  
Warnings of infectious Shi‘a unrest potentially spreading from Iran to Iraq originated in 
reports written in Baghdad for a State Department audience. The integration of such warnings 
into national level reports indicates the growth of American concerns. On June 21, 1979, the 
National Intelligence Estimate, a joint report written by the CIA, State Department, and National 
Security Agency, foretold that Iraq would likely need to use force to control Shi‘a unrest.167 An 
interagency intelligence report produced by the CIA later that year also raised the specter of 
growing Shi‘a dissidence spreading from Iran to Iraq.168 Notably, during this time, Saddam 
Hussein ruthlessly accumulated power, culminating in July 1979, when he emerged as President 
of Iraq upon al-Bakr’s resignation.169 
American diplomats possessed valid reasons for concerns, but misunderstood what was 
taking place across the social fabric of southern Iraq. As the historiography of Shi‘a  political 
organization demonstrates, far from importing the Iranian Revolution or yielding to the 
contagion of revolution spreading through a trans-border Shi‘a body, during this time, Da‘wa 
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altered its tactical approach in Iraq. Da‘wa transitioned from educational efforts and political 
organization to violent methods in reaction to the abuses of the Ba’athist government. Ayatollah 
al-Sadr called upon Iraqis, Sunni and Shi‘a alike to “assume a fighting position” and “save the 
umma from its present corrupt situation.”170 
American diplomats mistook Da‘wa’s efforts for Iranian influence among the Iraqi Shi’a 
population. Ignorant of Da‘wa and the political organization occurring among the Iraqi Shi‘a 
population in southern Iraq, diplomatic analysis was simplistic and devoid of historical context. 
This allowed American diplomats to associate Da‘wa’s novel turn to violence with the export of 
the Iranian revolution, although Da‘wa was an entirely indigenous, political Iraqi phenomenon 
independent of Iran. Moreover, many Iraqi Shi‘a leaders rejected the nature of political 
organization occurring in Revolutionary Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini governed Iran under the 
principles of wilayat al-faqih, the theological innovation of jurist rule he established during his 
years in Najaf. The majority of Iraqi Shi‘a ulama rejected wilayat al-faqih, including the leaders 
of Da‘wa who desired an Islamic form of government, but not the rule of religious leaders 
articulated in wilayat al-faqih. 
By misattributing Iraqi Shi’a political organization as religious, American diplomats 
missed the nascent political movement occurring among elements of the Iraqi Shi’a population. 
Thus, when the social turmoil preceding and during the Iranian Revolution occurred, American 
officials assumed that the seemingly sudden dissidence among Iraqi Shi’a was a result of Iranian 
interference, Iraqi Shi’a identification with the political movement in Iran, or a contagion affect 
through a homogenous trans-border Shi’a body. In actuality, the Shi’a dissidence movement and 
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increased levels of violence were the result of an indigenous logical outgrowth of a Shi’a 
political organization occurring over the previous twenty years.  
 Iraqi and American concerns over Shi‘a political opposition and the potential of Shi‘a 
collusion with Iran through trans-border religious connections were significant precisely because 
of the Shi‘a’s majority status within Iraq.171 Those invested in the status quo feared unrest among 
the Iraqi Shi‘a due to their numerical significance and the possible resonance of religious 
sectarianism throughout the entire Shi‘a population. Iraqi Shi‘a, however, were only a threat if 
significant mobilization created a mass movement.  While Da‘wa and similar groups opposed the 
Iraqi state and adopted militant efforts, in 1978-1979, these movements never gained the grass-
roots appeal and mobilization required to seriously threaten the viability of the Iraqi government.  
 American concerns of Shi‘a sectarianism may have mirrored those of the Iraqi 
government more broadly, but it is important to note that Ba’ath party was secular in nature and 
found all strongly-held religious beliefs suspicious, regardless of sectarian affiliation. Drawing 
on Iraqi archival material acquired after 2003, Joseph Sassoon examines transcripts of meetings 
between Saddam Hussein and key Ba’athist advisors to demonstrate similar concerns with 
Wahhabism, a distinctly Sunni conservative movement that originated in the Hejaz, part of 
modern Saudi Arabia.172 In adopting Iraqi fears of Shi’s sectarianism, American diplomats failed 
to understand the overarching Iraqi preoccupation with all religiosity that ran counter Ba’athist 
secularism, an approach that was not specific to the Shi‘a alone. Ba’athist leaders occasionally 
used religious language when seeking to mollify or manipulate the Iraqi population. Ba’athist use 
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of religion as a tool of manipulation and power accumulation further exacerbated their suspicious 
of religion wherever it was practiced.  
The limited or absent diplomatic relationship between Iraq and the United States 
inhibited a comprehensive American understanding and interpretation of events in Iraq. The 
limited American diplomatic presence in Iraq undermined the network of contacts used by 
Foreign Service officers and others in the Embassy to grasp the intricacies of Iraqi political and 
social fabric, leaving the United States reliant on previously conceived ideas of Iraq, reports from 
allies, or the few remaining Iraq contacts. Lack of diplomatic reach thus forced American 
officials to fall back on long-held notions of the Shi‘a role in Iraq and Iraqi politics, leading to 
little change during the early years of the diplomatic embargo in the late sixties and early 
seventies. By the late seventies, despite the lack of an American Embassy in Baghdad, American 
diplomats, working from the Belgium Embassy, developed an interest section in Baghdad and 
increased the degree of American diplomatic coverage in Iraq.173 However, the absence of long 
term diplomatic relations, connections with local Iraqis, and thus intellectual penetration into 
Iraqi society inhibited an American understanding of Iraqi political movements and social 
nuance and contributed towards an oversimplification of the Iraqi Shi‘a communities.  
 American officials often formed their opinions of Shi‘a sectarianism and local political 
activities based on a broad array of information provided by a number of local and regional 
contacts in the government and community. Often an implicit fact of diplomatic and intelligence 
efforts abroad, the identity and affiliation of local contacts can shape American perceptions that 
later become codified in reports. Because Iraqi Shi‘a always comprised a small minority within 
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the government, the information Americans received regarding the Shi‘a were often filtered 
through a Sunni mouthpiece, intent on maintaining the Sunni monopoly on power.  174 The 
composition of the Iraqi government inherently colored the information the American diplomatic 
community could access. Furthermore, the Iraqi government was not always forthcoming with 
information, and the American Interest Section in Baghdad’s reports occasionally mentioned 
Iraqi unwillingness to discuss limits to state power and tensions with the Iraqi Shi‘a 
population.175   
The lack of overarching Shi‘a cohesion and collusion across the Iran-Iraq border in this 
period holds important implications for the role of identity in Iraq. The growing American focus 
on Shi‘a sectarianism, and thus their religious identity, from 1958-1979 suggests an American 
focus on religious identity in Iraq to the neglect of ethnic and national forms of identity. While 
often lost to the overwhelming focus on Iraqi sectarianism, Iraqi Shi‘a located their identity 
within the national state construct, as well as nationalist Iraqi sentiments developed during the 
British Mandate in Iraq and under the leadership of King Faisal.176 Furthermore, centuries of 
conflict and war between Arab and Persian empires brokered Arab and Persian identities in 
opposition to one another.177  Essentializing Iraqi Shi‘a on religion alone disregarded modern 
histories of nationalism and empire and undermined significant aspects of Iraqi identity. 
Ultimately, as historian Yitzhak Nakash reminds us, Iraqi Shi‘a “stressed their Arab origins and 
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attempted to accommodate their dual identity [Shi‘a and Iraqi] within the framework of the Iraqi 
state.”178 During 1958-1979, the Iraqi Shi‘a total population did not embrace sectarianism to the 
denial of ethnic and national forms of identity. 
 Events in Iran were not the sole influence American perceptions of Shi‘a sectarianism. 
Shi‘a Muslims comprise significant minority groups in several Gulf states in the region, 
including Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, key American allies and oil exporters. The 1979 
Islamic Revolution and proceeding unrest in Iran prompted fears of a similar uprising among 
disenfranchised Shi‘a in the Gulf States. In December 1978, the Kuwaiti Amir suggested to the 
American Ambassador that the Shi‘a uprising taking place in Iran contained the potential to 
spread to Iraq, resulting in Shi‘a demands for a greater representation in the Ba’athist 
government.179 The following month, a State Department Intelligence Summary, produced in 
Washington and distributed to embassies and consulates across the Middle East, suggested that 
the Kuwaiti Amir’s concerns arose from Shi‘a criticisms of the Kuwaiti government and Shi‘a 
unrest internal to Kuwait.180 Such concerns were not limited to the Kuwaitis. In October 1979, 
the American Ambassador in Manama reported Bahrain’s concerns with unrest in its majority 
Shi‘a population.181 Local allies’ concerns about internal security and Shi‘a dissent thus fed 
American perceptions of Shi‘a unrest.   
 On January 2, 1979, during the unrest leading to the Iranian Revolution, Egyptian 
President Anwar Sadat met with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and discussed possible 
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outcomes if the Shah of Iran was overthrown. Sadat stressed the urgency and immediacy of the 
“imminent Iran debacle” and ominously warned that the Gulf States, with their oil reserves, were 
especially vulnerable to Iran.  Sadat then requested massive American military assistance. He 
suggested that Egypt donate much of their Soviet military material to African countries’ 
modernization efforts and receive new military hardware from the United States, comparable to 
that provided to Israel. He also requested a massive project to train Egyptian military officers in 
the United States.182 Sadat was not wrong in his assessment of the Iranian Revolution; the Shah 
left Iran for exile in Europe only two weeks later. However, it was in Egypt’s interest to 
exaggerate the dangers posed by the Iranian Revolution for the region, given the request for 
military assistance that immediately followed.  
Furthermore, Ayatollah Khomeini’s leadership aspirations were not limited to Iran alone. 
Khomeini sought to transcend Shi’ism and appeal to Muslims more broadly through his calls for 
a renewed emphasis on Islamic social justice, his rejection of imperial presence in the region, 
and his critique of Arab leaders allied with the West.183 Regional leaders recognized the 
possibility of Khomeini’s ideological appeal reaching beyond the Shi‘a to affect disenfranchised 
Sunni, augmenting their concerns of Shi‘a dissidence fueled by Khomeini.  
 As Sadat clearly recognized, a potential threat to American oil imports held the attention 
of American diplomats. In 1973, oil-producing Arab states leveraged trade as a political weapon 
and halted oil exports to the United States in retaliation for American support to Israel during the 
Yom Kippur War. The resulting oil crisis created an economic downturn in both the American 
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and global economies.184 Thus the United States was particularly sensitive to any possibility of 
disturbances to the oil trade. A 1979 National Intelligence estimate noted access to adequate oil 
supplies as a key American goal in the Middle East and claimed that Iraq possessed both the 
ability and the will to undermine American access to oil.185 In a memorandum prepared by the 
CIA the same year, analysts invoked the specter of the 1973 oil crisis before discussing the 
possibility of Iranian Shi‘a unrest infecting Iraq in context of instability in the Middle East 
negatively affecting American access to oil.186 Trans-border Shi‘a unrest was thus imbued with 
greater strategic significance due to the connection between Iraqi stability and the American oil 
trade. American oil access undergirded the American economy and preoccupied politicians, 
especially before critical elections. The theme of American national energy policy occurred 
during President Carter’s State of the Union Address in 1980, and in the Republican Party 
Platform created before the 1981 Presidential election.187 It is difficult to overemphasize the 
degree to which American diplomats and policy makers prioritized all matters related to oil trade 
and access. Threats to American oil access were a top priority.  
As previously discussed, American perceptions of Shi‘a sectarianism cannot be divorced 
from the Cold War. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the diversity of Iraqi political and social 
fabric was subsumed by American diplomats’ overwhelming focus on Iraq’s perceived alliances 
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with the Soviet Union and the domestic role of the Iraqi Communist Party.188 During the Iranian 
Revolution, the loss of Shah Pahlavi, a stalwart American ally against the Soviet Union, and the 
domestic turmoil in Iran led American diplomats and intelligence analysts to fear the possibility 
of Soviet incursions and influence in revolutionary Iran.  A 1979 CIA report worried that “the 
greatest potential for substantial Soviet gains in the near term is in Iran, where continuing serious 
instability could give way to a leftist regime more sympathetic to the USSR.”189 Concerns of 
trans-border Shi‘a connections and perceived Iraqi Shi‘a loyalty to Iran mapped onto broader 
worries regarding the spread of communism in the region.  
American diplomats’ worries about Soviet influence in revolutionary Iran were 
unfounded. To the contrary, the Islamic movement in Iran upended the binary order of the Cold 
War. Through the Iranian Revolution, Islamism emerged and halted communisms’ rule as the 
single ideological counter to American hegemonic aspirations. Odd Arne Westad, in a study of 
the global nature of the Cold War, describes the Iranian Revolution as a “watershed” moment for 
both superpowers, undermining American and Soviet aspirations for Iran.190 
The ideological underpinnings of the Iranian Revolution destabilized the bipolar world, 
but nothing proved more traumatic, unforgettable, or definitive for future American-Iranian 
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relations than the Iranian hostage crisis.191 The hostage crisis gripped America. Walter Cronkite 
closed his evening news broadcast with the number of days elapsed since the hostage crisis 
began. Television coverage displayed the hostages’ worried parents, spouses, and children, 
especially during the holiday season. The Carter Administration initially hoped to resolve the 
crisis quickly, but as time elapsed and the Ayatollah Khomeini cemented his leadership of Iran, 
the hostages became a pawn between two ideologically-opposed governments, symbolic of 
American impotence in the face of defiant Islamism.192 President Carter, despite his efforts, 
failed to convince Iran to release the hostages or retrieve them by force, facts that contributed to 
his defeat in the 1980 presidential election. Similar to the salience of American access to oil after 
the embargo in 1973, the Iranian hostage crisis imbued Shi‘a political dissidence with a sense of 
threatening fanaticism, exacerbating fears in in Washington and among the American public.  
 Despite Iraqi and American fears, political turmoil in Iran failed to infect the Iraqi Shi‘a 
population. By mid-year, the Iraqi government moved Army units away from the Shi‘a south, 
confident that they would not be required. The United States Interest Section was less convinced 
and expressed concerns of a simultaneous uprising in the Kurdish north and Shi‘a south.193 Later 
in the month, however, the Interest Section reported decreased indicators of Shi‘a unrest, a trend 
that continued throughout the rest of the year. 194 The tumultuous year closed without a Shi‘a 
revolt or widespread Shi‘a support of Iranian revolutionary ideals.   
                                                             
191 James Blight, et al argues that two “original sins” poisoned American-Iranian relation: American President Carter 
allowing the Shah to come to the United States for medical care after his ouster in 1979 (in Iranian perception), and 
the Iranian hostage crisis (in American perception) See Becoming Enemies, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2012).  
 
192 Melanie McAlister devotes a chapter to this topic in Epic Encounters, chapter 5.  
 
193 National Archives Central Foreign Policy Files, Department of State telegram, 112018ZJUL79 and 
081047ZJUL79.  
 
194 National Archives Central Foreign Policy Files, Department of State telegram, 240943ZJUL79. 
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Numerous factors, both internal and external to Iraq, influenced American diplomats’ 
understanding of Shi‘a sectarianism in Iraq. A lack of information about the Iraqi Shi‘a 
population and Shi‘a political organization, regional allies’ concern with their own 
disenfranchised Shi‘a populations, American worries of Shi‘a unrest potentially undermining oil 
access, fears about Soviet encroachment in Revolutionary Iran, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the 
loss of a prominent and influential American ally in Shah Pahlavi all imbued the specter of 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s brand of Islamic revolution with a particular salience. The threat posed by 
the possibility of unrest spreading beyond Iran through a trans-border Iraqi Shi‘a population 
subsumed earlier American understandings of the Iraqi Shi‘a population as politically distinct 
from Iran and loyal to Iraq. The unrest and events surrounding the Iranian Revolution 
significantly altered American perceptions of Shi‘a sectarianism.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
Edward Said famously argued that the West constructed a version of the Orient reflecting 
Western approaches to culture and colonial rule and inaccurately essentialized the social, 
cultural, and political diversity of “oriental” lands.”195 Inadvertently, American diplomats and 
intelligence analysts similarly created a mistaken understanding of Iraqi Shi‘a sectarianism that 
reflected a variety of American strategic concerns far more than it accurately portrayed Shi‘a 
religious or political movements within Iraq.  
In Colonialism in Question, Fredrick Cooper examines several flaws found in historical 
studies of post-colonial countries and emphasizes the importance of not “reading history 
backwards” or misapplying presentist notions, categories, or events backwards in an ahistorical 
manner.196 There is no ignoring or denying the role of sectarianism in rupturing Iraqi society 
during the uprisings that occurred after the American invasion in 1991 and the civil war that 
followed the American invasion in 2003. Fanar Haddad argues that both of these periods 
significantly altered sectarian relations within Iraq.197 Moreover, after 2003, Iran increased its 
influence and control in Iraq through the use of proxy forces and the manipulation of sectarian 
identities. The recent, post-2003, changes in Iraqi society and Iranian influence in Iraq make 
Cooper’s warning of vital importance for studies of Iraqi history. It is essential for historians to 
                                                             
195 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (Harmondsworth, United Kingdom: Penguin, 1995).  
 
196 Fredrick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005). 
 
197 Haddad, Sectarianism in Iraq, see chapters 4, 6, and 7.  
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proceed carefully with Iraqi history. Historians must distinguish the differences between events 
occurring in Iraq and the misplaced concerns of American diplomats and interrogate sources to 
insure that current inflamed sectarian tensions and a successfully interventionist Iranian foreign 
policy are not misapplied backwards onto Iraqi history.  
This work demonstrates the origins of American perceptions of Shi‘a sectarianism in 
Iraq, which crystalized during the Iranian Revolution and led to widespread concerns of Shi‘a 
collusion with revolutionary Iran, despite a history of independent Shi‘a  political organization 
and Shi’a refusals to support Iranian interference in internal Iraqi politics. Contrary to the 
modern narrative emphasizing intrinsic, indigenous sectarian conflict, the study of American 
diplomatic and intelligence records indicates that American perceptions of Shi‘a sectarianism 
developed in the late 1970s. Earlier American reports rarely identified the Iraqi Shi‘a as a 
significant dissident element within Iraq, nor note consequential Iraqi Shi‘a ties to Iran. It was 
not until the late 1970s, during the turmoil surrounding the Iranian Revolution, that American 
officials grew concerned of Shi‘a ties to Iran. The possibility of Shi‘a unrest in Iran spreading 
through the religious body into Iraq, exaggerated and exacerbated by local alliances and 
American strategic interests in the Middle East, subsumed previous American understandings of 
the Iraqi Shi‘a. American worries decreased in late 1979 as Iraqi stability prevailed and Saddam 
Hussein leveraged both the Ba’athist security apparatus and appealed to Shi‘a religiosity to 
maintain control of Iraq.  
If American concerns of Shi‘a sectarianism and trans-border alliances were proved 
unnecessary by the end of 1979, the following raises a number of questions with regard Iraqi 
Shi‘a solidarity with Iran or Iranian leverage over Iraqi Shi‘a. In September 1980, after decades 
of border disputes and proxy conflict, Iraq invaded Iran, precipitating an eight-year war and the 
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death of over a million people.  Early in the war, Ayatollah Khomeini hoped for an uprising 
among the Shi‘a in southern Iraq. With his optimistic view of the confessional bond, Khomeini 
reasoned that an internal uprising and external war would defeat Saddam Hussein and allow Iran 
to grow as a regional power. However, the anticipated revolt never occurred and historians 
debate whether national Iraqi or ethnic Arab ties proved stronger than sectarian loyalties or if the 
Ba’athist security state prevented a Shi‘a uprising. 198  
 
 
 
  
                                                             
198 See Fuller and Franke, The Arab Shiʼa, 110 for an argument of Shi’a ethnic and national solidarity. Kenan 
Makiya argues for total Ba’athist totalitarian penetration into society, preventing a Shi‘a uprising. Republic of Fear: 
the Politics of Modern Iraq, (University of California Press, 1998). 
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